Moral responsibility as requiring behavior arising "in the right way" from an agent's powers — with Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment" (1962) grounding the practices in our emotional responses to "the quality of others' wills towards us".
Branch
Ethics, metaphysics
Originated
the free will debate; Strawsonian turn 1962
Key Figures
Strawson, Frankfurt, van Inwagen, Vargas
Definition
Two traditional conditions: a control condition (the free will debate's center) and an epistemic condition — where ignorance may excuse depending on whether it traces to a blameworthy "benighting act" (H. Smith 1983).
Watson's distinction: excuses (the behavior was non-malicious) vs. exemptions (children, the psychologically impaired — not legitimate targets of the demands).
Origins & Development
Historical compatibilists: the Stoics, Hobbes, Hume, Ayer, Schlick — responsibility without libertarian freedom.
The Consequence Argument (van Inwagen 1983): if determinism is true, "our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past" — not up to us.
Frankfurt cases challenging the ability-to-do-otherwise requirement.
Main Positions & Arguments
Strawsonian: the reactive attitudes as responsibility's ground — resentment and gratitude not judgments to be argued for but practices to be understood.
Forward-looking: Schlick — responsibility as "the question concerning the correct point of application of the motive"; Smart (1961); Vargas's "agency cultivation model"; Pereboom's non-desert retention of some blaming practices.
Incompatibilist: desert requires ultimate control determinism cannot allow.
Objections
To compatibilism: manipulation and Consequence-style arguments; to forward-looking accounts: the wrongdoer used merely as a means.
Frankfurt’s cases split the ability-to-do-otherwise requirement from responsibility itself — a willing addict who could not have done otherwise still seems responsible for the using.