Scottish philosopher (1711–1776) whose Treatise of Human Nature — begun at 23, published anonymously, and famously claimed to have fallen "deadborn from the press" — carried empiricism to its skeptical conclusions: causation is a feeling of expectation, the self a bundle of perceptions, and morality rests on sentiment, not reason.
Born 1711; wrote the Treatise's first two books at La Flèche in France (Books 1–2 in 1739, Book 3 in 1740), later repudiated it and steered readers to his Enquiries.
Scottish Enlightenment figure alongside the Glasgow and Edinburgh circles; also the essayist and historian of his age.
Died in 1776 — the year of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, whose circles he moved in.
Key Contributions
Causation: no necessary connection between cause and effect is found in the objects themselves — only an internal "feeling of expectation" bred by repeated observation. The projection, not the connection, is what we call necessity.
Induction: the Uniformity Principle cannot be founded on reason, since any probable argument for it would be circular; our inferences rest instead on custom or habit — the classical problem of induction in its modern form.
The bundle theory of the self: finding no impression of an enduring self beneath our perceptions, he concluded the self is a bundle or succession of associated perceptions — and later voiced his own doubts about the theory in the Treatise's Appendix.
Morality: his Motivation Argument holds that morals excite passions and produce actions, while "reason alone... can never have any such influence" — so moral distinctions rest on sentiment, not on conclusions of reason.
Major Works
A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) — the young system.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) — the skeptical core, restated.
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) — the sentimentalist ethics.