The tripartite analysis — justified true belief — and the problem that has organized epistemology since 1963: Gettier's cases, with counterexamples that predate him by thirteen centuries (Dharmottara, c. 770 CE) and Russell's stopped clock (1923).
Branch
Epistemology
Originated
Theaetetus; the problem 1963
Key Figures
Gettier, Nozick, Sosa, Williamson
Definition
Truth, belief, justification — traditionally jointly sufficient; Gettier's Smith infers "Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona" from a justified falsehood that lands true by luck.
Zagzebski's 1994 recipe: take a justified false belief meeting any added condition X, make it true merely by luck — every such analysis falls.
Origins & Development
Plato's Theaetetus: knowledge as true belief with an account — the twenty-four-century program.
The 1963 paper, three pages, refuted the analysis; the half-century since has been fourth conditions.
Main Positions & Arguments
No false lemmas: the fourth condition that handles Gettier's own cases — but fails without inference: the robot-dog case, and the Barn County case of Ginet and Goldman (Henry sees the only real barn amid façades).
Sensitivity (Nozick 1981): if P were false, S wouldn't believe P — failing Barn County and generating DeRose's "abominable conjunction".
Safety (Sosa 1999): in nearby worlds where S believes P, P is true — with its own counterexamples (Comesaña; Neta and Rohrbaugh), and Williamson's circularity complaint.
Knowledge-first: Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits (2000) — reject the analysis; knowledge as "the most general factive mental state", fundamental.
Objections
To every fourth condition: Zagzebski's recipe; to knowledge-first: the informative characterizations it still owes.
Relevant alternatives theory — Stine, Goldman, Dretske, Lewis (1996) — is treated as the modal family’s third member: to know is to rule out the relevant alternatives, the standard’s contest deciding relevance.