The theory of knowledge — traditionally, knowledge of facts requiring truth, belief and justification — shaken since Gettier showed cases where justified true belief fails: Henry's belief about the one real barn among façades is true and reliably formed, yet true only by luck, so not knowledge.
Field
Knowledge, justification, warrant, skepticism
Originated
antiquity; modern form from Descartes
Key Figures
Descartes, Hume, Kant, Gettier, Quine
Related Branches
Metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophy of mind
Definition & Scope
The analysis of knowledge and its sources: what distinguishes knowing from merely believing truly.
The Gettier problem as the modern field's founding irritation — justification, truth and belief jointly insufficient.
The limits of cognitive success — skepticism as "a challenge to our self-conception as cognitively successful beings".
Historical Development
Descartes's methodological doubt set the modern agenda; Hume's induction and Kant's synthesis sharpened it.
Gettier's three-page 1963 paper reoriented the analysis of knowledge; the barn cases and lottery cases followed.
Empiricism vs. rationalism structured the modern sources debate; Quine's naturalized epistemology proposed dissolving the standpoint.
Central Questions
The structure of justification: foundationalism (justified beliefs like a building, basic beliefs below — "privilege" vs. "experiential" versions) against coherentism (a web, no basics — explanatory and reliability variants), each facing circularity; the regress argument foundationalism's case.
The five sources: perception (direct vs. indirect realism; the problem of non-circularly verifying perceptual reliability), introspection (its claimed special immunity), memory (seemings vs. remembering), reason (a priori vs. a posteriori; the synthetic a priori dispute), and testimony (lacking its own faculty — what justifies trusting it?).
Skepticism: general and selective; responses to closure, underdetermination, defeasibility and epistemic-possibility arguments.