The Vienna Circle's program: meeting weekly under Schlick from 1924 to 1936, the Circle used an empiricist criterion of meaningfulness to reject metaphysics — Wittgenstein's dictum, reported by Waismann (1929–30), that "the sense of a proposition is the method of its verification".
Era
1924–1940s
Region
Vienna, Berlin, then emigration worldwide
Key Figures
Schlick, Carnap, Neurath, Hempel
Core Ideas
Verificationism; anti-metaphysics; physicalism; unity of science
Origins & Development
Schlick appointed in 1922 to Mach's former chair in Vienna; the Circle convened from 1924, with the Berlin group (Reichenbach) as ally.
Around 1931 a "liberalization of empiricism" began — a left wing (Carnap, Hahn, Frank, Neurath) splitting from Schlick's conservative strictness on verifiability.
Schlick murdered in 1936; the Anschluss-era exodus dispersed members — Frank, Kaufmann, Brunswik and Bergmann to the USA in 1938, Zilsel and Rand to the UK, Gödel in 1940; a rump met in Vienna until roughly 1938.
Central Ideas
Verificationism: meaning as method of verification — and metaphysics, un verifiable, as nonsense rather than falsehood.
The protocol sentence debate: Neurath against Carnap's methodological solipsism; Carnap conceding in "On Protocol Sentences" (1932) that a physicalist basis was more "convenient"; Neurath's boat — scientists repairing a ship at sea, never able to enter dry dock.
Unity of science and physicalism: the left wing's program — one language for all the sciences, from physics to sociology.
Key Figures
Schlick — the leader, Mach's heir.
Carnap — the logic of science.
Neurath — the boat and the encyclopedia.
Hempel — the emigration's continuation.
Influence & Reception
The emigration seeded postwar analytic philosophy across America; the program's collapse — Quine's "Two Dogmas", Sellars's myth of the given — became the next philosophy's founding acts.
Popper, the Circle's outsider, kept its problems while replacing verification with falsification.