The mind's hold on its past — episodic memory for events, semantic for world knowledge, procedural for skills ("I remember how to ride a bicycle") — whose philosophy turns on what makes a mental state remembering rather than imagining.
Branch
Philosophy of mind, epistemology
Originated
Locke's criterion; causal theory 1966
Key Figures
Locke, Martin and Deutscher, Bernecker
Definition
The taxonomy (Squire 2009): declarative memory — episodic (events of the personal past) and semantic (general knowledge) — and nondeclarative, including procedural memory and priming.
The criterion of "mnemicity": distinguishing successful from unsuccessful remembering, and remembering from imagining.
Origins & Development
Locke's memory criterion of personal identity: a person now counts as the same as an earlier one because he remembers the earlier person's experiences.
The circularity objection — one can remember only one's own experiences, so memory presupposes identity — answered by Parfit's and Shoemaker's "quasi-memory", working like memory without implying identity.
The causal theory (Martin and Deutscher 1966; Bernecker 2008, 2010): remembering requires "an appropriate causal connection" with the original experience, typically via a continuously existing trace — largely eclipsing the older epistemic theory.
Main Positions & Arguments
Causal theory: the trace as memory's pipeline to the past.
Simulation theories: Shanton and Goldman (2010), Michaelian (2016), De Brigard (2014) — remembering as a form of imagining past events, where reliable, accurate imagination of an actual past event counts as remembering.
The challenge: if simulation suffices, the traditional qualitative distinction between memory and imagination dissolves.
Objections
To the causal theory: confabulation with intact causation; to simulation: the reliability gerrymander.
To Locke: the circularity that launched quasi-memory.
The sciences of memory — consolidation, reconsolidation, distortion — keep the philosophical criteria honest under empirical load.