Traditionally one of the four cardinal virtues — and, in Rawls's famous description, "the first virtue of social institutions" (1971, p. 3) — applied to actions, laws, policies, and the structures of society at large.
Branch
Political philosophy, ethics
Originated
antiquity; modern theory from 1971
Key Figures
Aristotle, Rawls, Nozick, Cohen
Definition
Double-aspect: a virtue of persons and a property of institutions, laws and policies — the same word judging character and constitution.
Distributive vs. corrective justice — a contrast traced to Aristotle; comparative vs. non-comparative as the modern cross-cut.
Origins & Development
The cardinal virtue in Plato's city and soul; Aristotle's geometrical proportion; the scholastic inheritance.
Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) re-founded the field — "the most widely-cited example of a contractarian theory": the original position, the veil of ignorance, primary goods, the difference principle.
Cohen's 2008 critique that Rawls's position is internally inconsistent regarding incentives — the internal debate the theory generated.
Main Positions & Arguments
Distributive principles: equality, desert, need — and sufficiency, holding that each person should have "enough" (Frankfurt 2015; critiqued by Casal 2007).
Entitlement vs. patterns: Nozick’s entitlement theory as the historical alternative to end-state and patterned theories — "liberty upsets patterns".
Corrective justice: remedies for wrongful interference with holdings — Bill stealing Alice's computer as the entry's standing example.
The specialized justices: retributive, global, intergenerational — each with its own SEP entry and literature.
Objections
To Rawls: the incentives critique; to desert: the luck objection; to sufficiency: Casal's — that sufficiency needs the very equality it claims to replace.
The entry’s corrective-justice example — Bill stealing Alice’s computer — grounds the distributive debates in the ordinary wrongs courts repair first.