"Trusting can be betrayed, or at least let down, and not just disappointed" — Baier's mark of the distinction from mere reliance: the broken alarm clock disappoints but does not betray.
Branch
Epistemology, ethics, social philosophy
Originated
theorized 1986–
Key Figures
Baier, Hardin, Hawley, Govier
Definition
Reliance "plus some extra factor" (Hawley 2014) — the search for the factor is the field.
Three-part structure (Hardin 2002): "A trusts B to do X" — variants with valued item C (Baier) or domain D; complete trust across the board is rare.
Origins & Development
Baier (1986) as the modern founding: trust requiring accepted vulnerability — risk of betrayal in particular — and heavy monitoring of the trustee undermining genuine trust.
Her "moral test" for trust relations: whether they survive the parties' full awareness of their terms.
Main Positions & Arguments
Betrayal's mark: the normative expectation distinctive of trust.
Institutional trust: Potter, Govier, Townley and Garfield on institutions; Hardin on government — but interpersonal trust as the paradigm the others presuppose.
Testimony's standing: trust as what entitles reliance on others' words — the epistemological extension.
Objections
Trust without reliance (the betrayed who never depended); reliance without trust (the alarm clock's cousin); the monitoring paradox — checking destroys what it verifies.
Baier’s moral test asks whether the relation would survive the parties’ full mutual awareness of its terms — trust in dependence, as she puts it, rather than trust in spite of it.
The three-part structure also separates trust’s scope: one may trust a colleague with a manuscript but not with a secret — domain by domain, not wholesale.
Institutional trust’s paradigm-dependence is its lesson: a court or a currency can be trusted only insofar as the web of interpersonal expectations holding it up can be — the model scales, it does not replace.