Aristotle's three kinds — pleasure, utility, virtue — as the reasons "for loving our friend"; the first two "at best deficient modes", the third the contemporary accounts' focus.
Branch
Ethics
Originated
Nicomachean Ethics VIII–IX
Key Figures
Aristotle, Stocker, Cocking and Kennett, Sherman
Definition
Genuine concern for the friend's own sake — the virtue friendship that survives when pleasure and utility fail.
Sherman's Aristotelian reading: character friends living together "by sharing in argument and thought" — a "singleness of mind" including sympathetic emotion and shared deliberation toward a joint conception of eudaimonia.
Origins & Development
The Nicomachean Ethics books VIII–IX as the founding text; the analytic debate from the 1970s.
Main Positions & Arguments
The morality debate: Stocker (1976) — consequentialism and deontology promote "moral schizophrenia", a split between moral reasons and motives undermining friendship; Railton's reply distinguishing subjective from objective consequentialism; Badhwar's counter that even the sophisticated forms remain incompatible.
The structural account: Cocking and Kennett (1998) — intimacy as friends being "receptive" to being "directed" and "interpreted": her interests shape yours, her interpretations reshape your self-understanding.
Against the secrets view: Thomas's disclosure model and passive "mirroring" both criticized.
Objections
To shared-lives views: the autonomy worry — Friedman's "federation" as the repair.
To partiality itself: the impartialist's charge that friendship is bias.
The emotion views of love and the structural accounts of friendship converge on the same insight: what matters is not what friends share but how the sharing reshapes them — the "drawing" of direction and interpretation.
Montaigne’s "because he was he, because I was I" remains the historical-relational answer’s most quoted ally against fungibility.