The social world as an ontological problem: how entities arising from interaction — money, borders, marriages, corporations — are "constructed", with Searle's constitutive rules: "X counts as Y in C" — a line of stones counts as a border; Bureau of Engraving paper counts as money.
Branch
Social ontology, social philosophy
Originated
Durkheim and Weber; analytic form 1995–
Key Figures
Searle, Gilbert, Bratman, List and Pettit
Definition
Two inquiries, analogous to semantics vs. metasemantics: the constituents and membership conditions of social things, and how social categories are constructed or "anchored".
Status functions imposed via collective acceptance, expressed in constitutive rules — always involving deontic powers: rights, duties, obligations — put in place by declarations (Searle 1995, 2010).
Origins & Development
From the classical sociologists' sui generis social fact to the analytic construction of institutional reality.
Money as the paradigm — the entry opens with it, including whether cryptocurrencies are money: commodity money socially constructed but not grounded; fiat money both (Epstein 2016).
Main Positions & Arguments
Group minds and agency: can groups have beliefs, intentions, emotions, bear responsibility? Bratman's shared intentions from individuals' knowledge and intentions; Gilbert's joint commitment; List and Pettit's supervenient group attitudes.
Construction without fantasy: social facts as real yet created — the field's delicate balance.
Objections
To Searle: the circularity of collective acceptance; to group agency: the individualist's elimination.
The deontic powers — rights, duties, obligations — that status functions carry are what make the social world normative rather than merely habitual: obligations, not just regularities.
List and Pettit’s supervenience claim gives the group its agency without a ghost: group attitudes nothing over and above individual attitudes, yet not reducible to any one of them.