The view "that there exist such things as abstract objects" — non-spatial, non-temporal, non-physical, non-mental, non-causal — spelled with a lower-case "p" to stay neutral on whether Plato himself endorsed it.
Era
ancient roots; modern form from 1884
Region
Greece; now analytic metaphysics worldwide
Key Figures
Plato, Frege, Gödel, Quine
Core Ideas
Abstract objects; ontological commitment; the epistemological problem
Origins & Development
The Theory of Forms is the ancient source; the modern doctrine — universals and mathematical objects as abstract — was given its first clear statement by Frege (1884), "the most important figure in the development of modern platonism", with Gödel, Russell and Quine among the endorsers.
Frege's ontological-commitment argument: from the truth of sentences like "3 is prime" to the existence of numbers as abstract objects.
Central Ideas
Abstract objects: the five negations that define them — and the ontology mathematics seems to require.
The epistemological argument: the entry's section 5, the most important argument against platonism — how could causally isolated objects be known?
The alternatives mapped: immanent realism (Armstrong, Maddy), conceptualism/psychologism (criticized via Frege), nominalism, Meinongianism, and non-factualism (Balaguer, Yablo, Warren); the One Over Many argument now "widely considered to be a bad argument".