The descriptive study of consciousness from the first-person point of view, founded by Husserl around the intentionality of mind — every act directed toward an object — and disciplined by the epoché: bracketing the question of the world's existence to study how things are meant.
Intentionality; the epoché; being-in-the-world; embodiment
Origins & Development
Brentano's teacher-pupil line: Brentano revived the medieval notion of intentionality ("intentional in-existence") — every mental act directed toward an object; Husserl made it phenomenology's core in the Logical Investigations (1900–01) and Ideas I (1913).
Noesis and noema: the intentional process distinguished from the ideal content, the "object as intended".
In the 1930s phenomenology migrated into French philosophy — Sartre (1943), Beauvoir (1949), Merleau-Ponty (1945) — stressing embodiment against Cartesian dualism.
Central Ideas
The epoché (Ideas I): bracketing the natural world's existence — seeing a tree, my experience is of a tree whether or not it exists; what matters is how the object is meant.
Hermeneutic phenomenology:Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) rejected the bracketing — we are always already being-in-the-world; phenomenology as "letting things show themselves", practical comportment (hammering) over representation, fundamental ontology centered on Dasein.
Embodiment: the French generation's answer to Descartes — the lived body as the subject of perception.