The object of a philosophy first named by Ernst Kapp in 1877 — and of a dispute over its essence: whether it is neutral means or a "wrongheaded attitude toward Being" that, per Heidegger, has been growing for roughly twenty-five centuries.
Branch
Philosophy of technology, ethics
Originated
named 1877; field from the 1960s
Key Figures
Kapp, Mitcham, Heidegger, Ihde
Definition
The classic divide — Skolimowski (1966) and Simon (1969): "science concerns itself with what is, whereas technology concerns itself with what is to be."
Bunge's moderate view: substantive theories (about the object of action) vs. operative theories (about action itself) — engineering knowledge of both kinds.
Origins & Development
Kapp's 1877 founding; Mitcham's Thinking Through Technology (1994) distinguishing "humanities philosophy of technology" from "engineering philosophy of technology".
Analytic philosophy of technology since the 1960s — studying engineering practice itself rather than treating technology as a "black box".
Main Positions & Arguments
The neutrality thesis: artifacts as value-neutral means (Pitt 2000) — against the value-laden view that designs carry their politics in their structure.
Heidegger's diagnosis: technology's grip on society as symptom of a deeper wrong toward Being — with his own denial that his discussion counted as a philosophy of technology.
Ethics of technology: AI ethics, digital ethics, nanoethics as emerging fields; design ethics on three assumptions — a proactive stance and "front-load[ing]" ethical issues into design among them.
Objections
To neutrality: the bridge with Robert Moses's low overpasses — the value-laden counterexample; to Heidegger: the nostalgia charge.
Ihde’s postphenomenology — the empirical turn’s method: technologies studied through the mediations they create rather than judged in the abstract.